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Introduction 
For the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the coming years, 2010 and 2011, can 
be a milestone in its internal and external development. In 2010 the DRC will be in 
the spotlights for its fifty years of independence and during the following year, the 
second democratic elections after the formal end of the transition in 2006, should 
take place. Both for the DRC and the international community, these events are an 
opportunity to look back on the past Congolese development process and the role 
of the international community therein. It also entails the opportunity to learn 
from past mistakes and cooperate even more intensively on more clearly defined 
priorities. 
Especially since the signing in 2002 of the All Inclusive Agreement, that marked 
the start of the Congolese transition process, the country has been a spearhead in 
the European Union’s development, foreign and security policy. During these past 
years, the European Union resumed its engagements with the DRC: in financial 
terms through the European Commission’s Development DG, in diplomatic terms 
through a more prominent role of the High Representative and the EU Special 
Representatives Aldo Ajello, currently succeeded by Roeland van de Geer, and in 
operational terms through the deployment of several military and civilian ESDP 
missions. In addition, several member states of the EU (re-)intensified their 
relations with the DRC, through financial means, development initiatives, 
diplomatic engagements, and other instruments and initiatives.  
The EU and its member states developed initiatives on almost all policy fields, from 
infrastructure, good governance, education, health and social protection, and 
security of the Congolese people. However, seven years after the signing of the All 
Inclusive Agreement, and 3 years after the first democratic elections in the country 
in 2006 that formally ended the transition process, these challenges are still 
omnipresent and the role of the European Union, and the rest of the international 
community is far from being accomplished. Even more, the formal end of the 
transition process created a new challenge for both the Congolese authorities and 
the international community. While the international community played the first 
violin in the DRC during the transition process, the end of it marked the start of 
Congolese leadership in the further development process and the initiatives of the 
international community. 
Taking the reform of the Congolese police sector as a focal point, we see that 
effective Congolese leadership and coordination with and within the international 
community is a major, if not the most important challenge. This paper 
concentrates on this major challenge of coordination in European policies with 
regard to the Congolese police reform. In the first part, the multiple dimensions of 
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coordination between the various actors involved in foreign policies towards the 
DRC will be elaborated. The second part of the paper will deal with the European 
policies in the reform of the Congolese police sector and will contain an assessment 
of the role and functioning of the current coordination structures that are set up in 
Kinshasa to draft, organise and implement the Congolese police reform1. 
The Congolese reform has been selected as a case for this research for multiple 
reasons. First, among the various challenges the Congolese government and society 
faces, internal security and stability is probably the most important one, and a 
prerequisite for development in other domains. However, for both the Congolese 
society and the international community, the Congolese police has never been a 
major priority, in comparison to the reform of the Congolese army. The reform of 
the national Congolese police (PNC) is still in its infancy which makes it interesting 
to follow and research its initial phases. Second, also in the empirical literature on 
development in the DRC, the Congolese police and its reform has hardly been at 
the centre of the academic debate. This research therefore contributes and 
complements the literature on the DRC and the international involvement. 
Challenges of Multi-Level and Multi-Location Foreign Policy 
Coordination 
Dimensions of Coordination 
The question of coordination in foreign policy contains multiple dimensions 
(Reychler, 2010). First it deals with the actors involved. Before all the international 
players, the target country itself is the most important actor. However, at the level 
of the target country, a subdivision can be made between the multiple actors 
involved, such as governmental actors, civil society, NGO’s, etc. This is also the 
case at the international level. Here, individual states play a crucial role, in 
addition to international or regional organisations, transnational movements, 
INGO’s, and even private actors such as multinational corporations should be taken 
into account. 
A second dimension relates to the patterns of  coordination among these actors, or 
its purpose. Coordination can contain a mere exchange of information among the 
actors, or involve joint planning, collective problem-solving, or pooling of resources 
and cooperation on the implementation of policies. Foreign policy actors are driven 
by different motives, interests, agendas and goals, inspired by specific foreign 
policy traditions, and dispose of diverse and unequally divided foreign policy 
                                                             
1 The analysis is based on 35 interviews conducted by the author in Brussels (April-August 2009, 
October-November 2009) and in Kinshasa (September 2009). 
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capabilities (both material and immaterial resources2) and instruments. Yet, at the 
same time, the interconnectedness and complexity of most foreign policy dossiers 
renders it impossible for actors to tackle individually these problems. These 
characteristics of foreign policy actors and foreign policy problems create 
ambivalent patterns of interaction based on both interdependency and 
competitiveness between the actors. 
Third, coordination can take multiple forms, which relates both to the number of 
coordinating actors (bilateral, multiple bilateral, multilateral) and to the nature of 
their interactions (in formal organizational structures or in informal networks). 
Bilateralism, multiple bilateralism and networking are of growing importance in 
the process policy-making that involves more and more actors and becomes 
increasingly complex. In view of the above-mentioned characteristics of foreign 
policy actors (resources, motives, etc.), choices are made to act through bilateral 
contacts, multiple bilateral contacts, networks or multilateral frameworks. For 
specific issues, particular actors might be more relevant to work with in terms of 
capabilities, efficiency, credibility, etc. This might lead to the creation of informal 
patterns of bilateral contacts, multiple bilateralism or networks. However, 
variations not only exist in terms of number of actors involved, differences are also 
possible in the intensity of the relations and contacts and the degree of formality of 
these interactions, leading to a kind of variable geometry in this coordination. The 
absence of hierarchy and formal procedures that characterize informal interactions 
between actors, makes it often easier to exchange sensitive information, to 
coordinate and mediate between actors, and to react swiftly to external changes 
and to conduct complex negotiations on differentiated and often technical issues. 
Moreover, with regard to foreign policy, these forms of coordination are taking 
place at the various locations where these actors are based (such as Brussels, New 
York and Kinshasa). 
In the following sections, these dimensions of coordination will be further 
elaborated and applied to the European foreign policies towards the DRC, in which, 
as will be argued, only a few actors are really relevant. The case study will point to 
four interconnected levels of coordination: within the DRC (1) between the 
Congolese authorities and the Congolese civil society, and (2) within the Congolese 
government between various ministries; and at the external level (3) within the 
European Union, and (4) between the European Union and other international 
actors involved in the DRC. 
                                                             
2 Material resources are, for instance, financial and operational capabilities, number of diplomats and 
diplomatic representations. Immaterial resources consist, amongst others, expertise, knowledge, 
credibility, privileged relationships, but also public support for foreign policy actions. 
  5 
Mapping the key actors in the Congolese Police Reform 
A huge number of actors, both international and European, are, in the one way or 
the other, involved in the Congolese development process. Belgium, the UN, 
France and the US are already engaged for multiple decades, like some African 
countries such as Angola and South-Africa and African regional organisations such 
as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). More recently, also other actors, such as China, the UK, Japan, Sweden, 
Germany and the EU institutions became active in different sectors in the DRC. 
However, important differences exist between all these actors in terms of interests, 
approach, financial and other resources, and the effective development of activities 
with regard to the Congolese development. Therefore, significant differences 
among these actors in terms of relevance, for the Congolese development and the 
Congolese government. 
 
Figure 1 Key actors in the Congolese Police Reform 
 
As illustrated by figure 1, in the reform of the national Congolese police (PNC), 
only a limited number of actors are really relevant. The DRC occupies a central 
position as the ‘owner’ of this reform. This is an important principle that has been 
recognised by both developing and developed countries in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. However, the dotted line reflects the multiple 
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difficulties that impede or even undermine this central position, which will be dealt 
with in the following section. The DRC is the first actor all the external players 
have to cooperate with. As can be derived from the variable lines in the figure, 
important differences exist in the relations between the DRC and the various 
external actors. This also has an impact on the relations among the external actors, 
their approach and their coordination. 
The figure also illustrates that with respect to the Congolese police reform, we 
observe that only a limited number of external actors matter. Before elaborating 
these actors, their characteristics and their interactions more into detail, figure 1 
provides a simplified overview of the most significant players in the Congolese 
police sector. The thickness of the circles reflect the relative importance of the 
actors. At the European level, the UK is the most important actor. Its Department 
for International Development (DFID) has, for the coming five years, the most 
important budget for the support of the Congolese police reform and is 
consequently a very active but also very effective partner therein. More than the 
other actors, DFID developed a very good relationship with the Congolese (police) 
authorities which facilitates its work in the sector. For the EU institutions, the 
Delegation of the European Commission, and the Council’s EUPOL mission 
accompany the Congolese police in its reform. Figure 1 presents Belgium as a 
relative important actor, however with some reservations to be made (represented 
by the dotted line of the circle). Belgium does not bilaterally develop initiatives in 
the Congolese police reform, but contributes in the framework of EUPOL RDC and 
is a very visible actor in Kinshasa, with of course a special relationship with the 
DRC. Probably even more than for other international players, the Congolese 
people has high expectations from the Belgians, which they, however, not meet 
yet3. At the extra-European level, the most important players are the United 
Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC), and Japan and South Africa on a bilateral 
basis. 
However, the actors in this general picture are more complex than presented at 
first sight, and their interactions are determined by various factors. The different 
relationships and patterns of coordination between the external actors are not 
                                                             
3 As former colonial ruler the Belgians created the first police structures in the country that, what’s 
more, functioned. This is a perception that has been passed on several generations and is still very 
present among the Congolese people. Belgium occupies an ambivalent position. The former colonial 
ruler has diplomatically not always a smooth relationship at the governmental level, and did exploit 
the Congolese population and resources, yet on the other hand, for the Congolese people ‘Belgium’ 
still represents the potential prosperity, stability and order that the country knew during the colonial 
rule. To completely grasp this, we need to understand the situation of the Congolese people today, 
who are still oppressed, whose resources are still exploited, and face insecurity, disorder and 
enormous poverty.  
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presented in this figure. The following sections will zoom in on the complexity of 
the Congolese and European actors in this reform and the patterns and forms of 
their coordination, internally and externally, in the reform of the Congolese police 
sector. 
The Central Position of the DRC 
The most crucial actor for the development of foreign (aid) policies and the 
international coordination on these policies is the target country itself. It is the 
target country that needs to monitor and steer foreign interventions from other 
countries, on the basis of national strategies and integrated action plans in which 
the needs and priorities for the reform are elaborated. The target country should 
not only take the lead in these development policies (‘ownership’), but its priorities 
and strategies should also be the first reference points for actors of the 
international community in the development of their policies (‘alignment’). This 
should avoid development and reform ‘blue-prints’ from the international 
community that do not take country-specific situations, realities and priorities into 
account. Although this is acknowledged by both international donors (individual 
states and multilateral organisations) and developing countries in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, in practice numerous problems challenge the 
principle of ownership, which in turn hampers the principle of alignment and the 
effectiveness of foreign policies towards the country. 
Figure 2 illustrates that two dimensions of coordination are important at the level 
of the DRC as a first step in the policy process and the development of foreign 
policies of other countries. First between the government of the DRC (GDRC) and 
the civil society, the representing the Congolese population. In a country that has 
for decades been dominated by colonial rule till 1960 and from 1965 till 1997 by 
dictatorial rule, and that has for a large period of time been in war, a huge and 
multidimensional antagonism exists between the authorities and the Congolese 
people (Fieldhouse, 1983). Prosperity was distributed extremely unequally and in 
the hands of only a handful dignitaries. Basic provisions, such as education, health 
and social security, water, food and electricity, were totally dominated by the 
highest authorities, and policies were in the first place developed to serve the 
authorities. This was especially visible during last 20 years of General Mobutu’s 
dictatorial rule, who illustrated at that time the personification and patrimonialism 
of political power and Congolese properties (Clapham, 1992; Englebert, 2000). 
Development and humanitarian aid from international donors did never trickle 
down to the Congolese people and even increased inequalities and corruption. 
Till today this has important repercussions on the relations between the GDRC and 
the Congolese population. This is also visible at the level of the police, that has for 
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decades served as a protecting force for a small group of dignitaries, instead of 
serving the Congolese people. One of the most important deficiencies of the PNC is 
still its troubled relationship with the Congolese people, that perceives the police as 
a ‘public force’ instead of a ‘public service’. Coordination between the GDRC and 
the civil society, and among the actors of the civil society is necessary to create 
strategies for ‘community policing’ (see also Hills, 2000) adapted to the 
expectations of the Congolese people. 
However, at this first level of coordination, between the Congolese civil society and 
the GDRC, numerous difficulties arise, that will for reasons of simplicity be 
classified in a few categories. First of all, politically, civil society is not that 
organized and that strong as the coordination model assumes. The national 
Congolese police has no union to protect its interests. Moreover, the civil society 
organisations and unions that exist, experience huge difficulties to interact with 
political levels, to reach the Congolese people, and to organise their activities (or 
even survive) with the very limited means at their disposal. Second, territorially, 
the DRC is a country with a vast surface4. This means that huge differences exist 
between multiple parts in the country, linguistically5, politically and in terms of 
traditions and customs. It also means that civil society in Kinshasa is not the same 
as civil society in Kisangani, Lubumbashi or elsewhere in the country. As is the 
case in several developing countries, civil society in the DRC is relatively young 
actor, since it has for decades been oppressed by dictatorial rule. Obviously this has 
important repercussions for its relations with and impact on the Congolese 
population, its organisation, functioning and role in the Congolese development. 
Similar question marks are in order with regard to the role of political parties, and 
more in particular the political opposition parties. This contrasts sharply with the 
role and impact of churches in the DRC that have an important, yet not always 
favourable for the Congolese development, impact on the Congolese population. 
 
A second level of coordination within the DRC is the coordination between 
multiple ministries and official structures involved in the Congolese police reform. 
The President of the Republic is of course de facto the most important player, 
assisted by the different ministries. In addition to the Ministry of Interior under 
which the police structures are located, multiple other ministries are involved in 
this reform process, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Plan, Ministry of Decentralisation, the 
                                                             
4 The Democratic Republic of Congo has a surface of 2 345 000 km², which is ca. 80 times larger than 
Belgium (30 528 km²). In comparison, the EU has a surface of 4 376 780 km². 
5 The DRC has more than 456 different languages. French is the main language in the administration 
and education. 
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Ministry for Human Rights, etc. These ministries are involved since the reform of 
the PNC also includes the relations between the police and the judicial sector, 
between the police and the army, etc. Moreover, reforming the national police also 
requires the involvement of police and police authorities from all the state 
structures, provincial and local structures and their representatives. An integrated 
strategy for the reform of the Congolese police means that it part of a broader 
development strategy and complements reforms of other sectors such as the army 
and the judicial system. A general problem is also the lack of Congolese budget for 
its reforms. Especially due to corruption in the public administration and 
mismanagement of its natural resources, the Congolese government has only 
limited revenues (de Villers, 2009). 
However, also at this level multiple problems arise with regard to coordination 
among these actors. First, the different ministries involved have different agendas, 
priorities, approaches, capabilities and interests in the police reform, and are, at 
the same time occupied with their own sectoral reforms. In practice, significant 
differences and tensions exist between various sectoral reform agendas, 
undermining their complementarity. Second, the ministers themselves are often 
replaced, even multiple times a year, which impedes the continuity of the 
interactions, both at the personal and institutional level. Moreover, when a 
minister is replaced, also his cabinet is replaced and it is not unusual that 
important information disappears together with the minister and its cabinet 
(Trefon, 2004). Third, in view of the vast surface of the country it is a difficult job 
to involve all actors from provincial and local structures. In addition, these state 
levels are also object of an important reform plan that aims to restructure the 
Congolese decentralisation in new provinces. This restructured decentralisation 
has not yet been implemented, so coordination between the central and the 
decentralised levels are still taking place on the basis of the current structures. In 
the future, however, coordination will continue with new actors in new structures. 
 
  10 
Figure 2 Coordination at the Congolese level 
 
 
In sum, multiple levels of coordination within the DRC occupy a central position in 
the formulation and implementation of development policies for the country, and 
more in particular the reform of the country’s police sector. However, as has been 
argued, coordination among these levels and actors within the DRC is subject to 
major obstacles and difficulties that hamper the country in developing a 
comprehensive and integrated reform strategy and action plans. The difficulties 
(and even lack) of formulating and prioritizing actions results in serious troubles 
for the Congolese government in taking the lead in the Congolese police reform. 
For the external actors involved this means that their actions are not based on and 
aligned with Congolese action plans and priorities and therefore risk to become less 
effective or even in vain. 
European and Extra-European Coordination 
At the European level, the most important actors in the Congolese police reform 
are the UK, the EU, and to a limited extent France, Germany and Belgium. 
However, at this level, complexities arise with regard to the European policies in 
the Congolese police reform, since the EU is a fragmented actor whose foreign 
policies are characterized by a multi-pillar, multi-level and multi-location nature 
(Justaert and Keukeleire, 2010). 
First, the foreign policy of the EU has a ‘multi-pillar’ nature. EU foreign policy is 
conducted through both the EU’s first, second and third pillar, comprising different 
policy dimensions for which varying regimes and procedures are in force, and 
Congolese Government (GDRC) 
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different instruments are available. Second, EU foreign police has a ‘multi-level’ 
nature, since it remains predominantly a shared competence between the member 
states and the EU. Member states are able to conduct their own foreign policies by 
means of bilateral relations. An important aspect in this respect are the differences 
between the member states in their external representations. It is obvious that not 
all member states are represented in the DR Congo and participate actively in the 
operational policies on the field. In Kinshasa, only a handful of member states have 
their own embassy, of which the most important are the UK, France, Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Consequently, European coordination in Kinshasa 
does not involve all 27 member states. Third, in addition to bilateral initiatives and 
the EU as a political arena, member states pursue foreign policy objectives through 
multiple locations and fora, such as NATO, the OSCE, the UN, the international 
financial institutions, sub-regional cooperation forums. This is what we refer to as 
‘multi-location’ foreign policy (see Wallace, 2005: 78; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 
2008: 31-2). Moreover, nearly all foreign policy actions undertaken by the EU are 
developed in parallel to the actions of other countries and international 
organizations, such as the UN, the African Union (AU), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), etc. and sometimes also on their initiative or at 
their request. This explains the strong need to coordinate policy with other 
international organizations and other relevant third countries - both functionally, in 
terms of resource effectiveness, problem-solving and specialization, and 
operationally, in terms of exchanging information, meetings, joint programmes, 
studies, analyses and evaluations, sharing of best practices and lessons learned 
through implementation (Söderbaum and Stalgren, 2008: 17-21). 
As a consequence, EU foreign policy-making involves a large number of actors (the 
member states, EU institutional actors and bodies, specialized agencies, and – 
although often disregarded in foreign policy – non-governmental organisations, 
etc.). This multi-divided nature of EU foreign policy, between the EU and its 
member states, among the member states themselves and among the EU 
institutions and bodies themselves, produces a wide range of constraints in terms 
of diverging interests, priorities, strategies, capabilities, and also in terms of 
coherence and effectiveness. Therefore, coordination is necessary both internally 
within the EU, and externally, between the EU and the other international players 
involved in the Congolese police reform. Internal, within the European Union as 
foreign policy actor, coordination is necessary among the European institutions 
(between the Commission and the Council), between the EU and its member 
states, and among the member states themselves. Externally, coordination is 
needed between the EU member states, EU institutional actors on the one hand 
and other international or regional organisations and third countries on the other. 
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However, despite the strong need for inter-organizational coordination, formal 
coordination mechanisms with other international actors are in general too weakly 
developed for allowing intensive and detailed coordination on specific foreign 
policy dossiers. Finally, even if some formal coordination mechanisms between 
various international actors do exist on a bilateral basis, what does not exist at all 
are formal coordination mechanisms that bring together a larger number of 
international actors -  even though precisely this is needed in view of the ‘multi-
location’ nature of foreign policy-making towards most issues.  
 
Figure 3 aims to represent the European and extra-European (international) actors, 
and their institutional affiliations. With regard to the Congolese police reform, only 
a limited number of actors are really engaged. However, the figure illustrates that 
behind the international actors in figure 1, fragmented structures and complex 
relations arise. 
At the EU level, both the European Commission and the Council are involved in 
the Congolese police reform (see also Justaert and Keukeleire, 2010). The reform 
demonstrates that the delineation between CFSP / ESDP and EC security 
competences is often not at all clear. The Council of the EU is diplomatically 
involved in this police reform through the EU Special Representative for the Great 
Lakes Region (EUSR) since 1996. This post was first occupied by Aldo Ajello 
(Spanish), and since 2007 by Roeland van de Geer (Dutch). Operationally, the 
Council has under its ESDP framework deployed two civilian police missions in 
support of the Congolese police. In 2005 EUPOL Kinshasa was launched that had to 
monitor and give advice to the Congolese Integrated Police Units (IPU) in view of 
electoral security (Martinelli, 2006, Remacle and Martinelli, 2007). This mission 
was succeeded by EUPOL RDC in 2007. The mandate of EUPOL RDC is larger than 
the mandate of its predecessor and is foreseen to end in 2010. While EUPOL 
Kinshasa concentrated on the creation of the IPU in Kinshasa, EUPOL DRC 
supports the entire Congolese National Police in terms of concepts for reform, 
training and equipment, and the relations between the police and the judicial 
sector. 
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Figure 3 Coordination at the European and extra-European level 
 
 
Also the European Commission is involved in the Congolese police reform through 
various channels. Mainly through its (9th and 10th) European Development Fund 
(EDF), the Commission contributes to the police reform by providing equipment, 
infrastructure and technical support (European Commission 2008; Davis 2009a, 27-
29; Davis 2009b). These initiatives are in support of other EU initiatives, such as 
EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RDC, or in support of initiatives developed in other 
frameworks. Furthermore, the Commission contributes to the Congolese police 
reform via financial support to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), that is 
involved in the training and equipment of the PNC. 
 In these processes from both the Council and the Commission, several member 
states are involved. The provision of equipment for the IPU in Kinshasa (uniforms, 
anti-riot equipment, small weapons), for example, was assured by Germany, 
Hungary and Belgium. Also for ESDP operations, the EU relies on voluntary 
contributions of the member states, both for the financial part, and the operational 
part. To the personnel of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RDC, six member states 
contributed: Portugal (the head of EUPOL RDC is the Portuguese Custodio), 
Belgium, Italy, Sweden, France and the Netherlands (International Crisis Group, 
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2006). Moreover in EUPOL Kinshasa also Turkey and Canada contributed and in 
EUPOL RDC also Angolan police officers take part. Within these countries 
internally, multiple ministries are involved: not only Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
also Home Affairs, that detaches its police personnel and Budget, with traditional 
tensions and intra-governmental deals that go hand in hand when several 
governmental actors are involved that have to share responsibilities and financial 
consequences. 
Among the EU member states, the UK is the most important actor in the Congolese 
police reform (as indicated in figure 1). Its development policy and programmes 
are managed by the Department for International Development (DFID) that also 
has a strong delegation in the DRC (based in Kinshasa). In addition to the UK, also 
other EU member states, such as France and Germany developed and still develop 
bilateral initiatives in the Congolese police reform, for some on top of their 
participation to EUPOL Kinshasa and RDC. 
Belgium occupies a rather special position, as can be derived from the circle in 
dotted line in figure 1. Bilaterally, the country is not directly involved in the 
Congolese police reform, but concentrates on the reform of the army (International 
Crisis Group, 2006: 9-12). In the EU framework the Belgians contributed police 
personnel for both EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL DRC. Even more, although they 
operate under the umbrella of the ESDP mission, the Belgian police officers in 
EUPOL RDC are often approached as ‘the Belgians’, both by the Congolese police 
and other actors, such as South-Africa. 
Apart from member states’ bilateral initiatives and efforts in the EU framework, 
also other international organisations and arenas conduct security and defence 
policies towards the DRC. The UN and its various agencies play a central role in 
steering the international policy towards the DR Congo. The EU provides active 
support for the UN initiatives and in some cases also taking responsibility for part 
of the implementation of UN programmes. For instance, a part of the Commission’s 
programmes are primarily aimed at supporting UN programmes (and NGO’s). 
Moreover is the UN an important framework for EU member states to implement 
policies in the Congolese police reform through the MONUC. As permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, the UK and France also play an crucial role 
through this framework. In addition to the UN, also other international or regional 
organisations play a role in the Congolese police sector. Important in this respect is 
the support from the AU and the SADC, the latter chaired for two years (since 
September 2009) by the Congolese President Joseph Kabila. 
Furthermore, also the Japanese, South-African and Angolan governments are 
bilaterally involved in the reform of the Congolese police sector. For South Africa 
and Angola, that are both members of the AU and the SADC, the intensive 
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participation is part of a broader strategy to create more African ownership in 
international development policies towards the continent. The initiatives and 
policies of these African states should also be taken into account in the European 
coordination frame, since particular member states maintain special relationships 
with them. For the UK, for instance, its former colony South Africa has always 
been a solid partner with similar approaches in the Congolese police reform. For 
the Portuguese head of EUPOL RDC, Custodio, the active participation of Angola is 
an important element.  
The Congolese Police: Challenges and Obstacles towards Reform 
In this second part of the paper, we build on the previous analysis of coordination 
and its challenges to assess how the various actors defined have contributed, and 
still contribute to the Congolese police reform. First, a brief overview is presented 
of the Congolese police and the context of its reform. Second, this serves as a 
starting point for the analysis of the role of the European actors in this reform 
process, with special attention for the multiple challenges and difficulties of 
coordination among the actors involved, both in Brussels and Kinshasa. 
The challenges of the Congolese police 
The signing of the All Inclusive Agreement in December 2002 marked the start of 
the transition period in the DRC aimed to deliver democratic institutions, peace, 
and security in the entire country (Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 2002). The challenges 
during the transition were multiple. The transitional authorities, under the 
direction of interim-president Kabila and four vice-presidents, had to draft and 
adopt a new constitution, organise democratic elections, and bring peace and 
security to the entire country. In December 2005 the new constitution was adopted 
and in (July – October) 2006 the parliamentary and presidential elections took 
place (de Villers, 2009). The transition officially came to an end in October 2006 
with the inauguration of Joseph Kabila as directly elected President of the Republic 
(Keane, 2008: 218). The establishment of peace and security in the country, 
however, has proven to be the most complicated and difficult challenge, which did 
not come to an end with the formal termination of the transition period. Especially 
in the East of the country, the instability remains enormous and is complicated by 
the difficult relationship among the conflicting parties, involving the Congolese 
army, police and multiple rebel groups, both Congolese and Rwandese. 
The Congolese police is the first responsible for the security of the Congolese 
people. However, among the multiple challenges in the DRC, the reform of the 
police has hardly been a priority for the Congolese government nor for the 
international community. In comparison to the Congolese army, the police is a 
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sector in which the international community only recently engaged on the long 
term. This is also reflected in the All Inclusive Agreement, between the Congolese 
parties in the international donors, in which no reference to the PNC is 
incorporated. Unlike the judicial power and the army, for which the structures are 
incorporated in the agreement, the police is only been referred to in annex V, point 
2.a.: “An integrated police force shall be responsible for ensuring the safety of the 
government and the population” (Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 2002). 
However, the PNC is subject to multiple challenges and difficulties and does not 
manage to take up its role as a public service responsible for security of the 
Congolese people. The multiple deficiencies and challenges can briefly be classified 
in the following categories: structure, management, formation, and equipment and 
responsibilities. First, the existing structures of the PNC are extremely complex and 
rigid, and, for an immense country like the DRC, too centralised. Moreover, 
relations between the PNC and the judicial sector, and between the PNC and the 
national Congolese army (FARDC – Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 
du Congo) are at all levels not formally settled, and vary between different 
provinces and even between local communities. Second, its management is 
undermined by a high degree of corruption, which trickles down to the police 
officers at all levels. Salaries, for instance, do not always reach the police officers at 
the lowest levels, which keeps the corruption of police officers in the streets alive. 
Recruitment and promotion of police officers is often also dominated by 
corruption, or personal (kinship) relations. Third, police officers have a variable 
level of training, or even no training at all. This creates important differences 
between police officers in terms of level of engagement and perception on its role. 
Knowing that the PNC is not only compiled of new recruited police officers, but 
also of former combatants from rebel groups and officers that served under former 
(also dictatorial) police structures, training and a fundamental change of mentality 
are crucial elements for reform. Fourth, the PNC lacks the necessary budget and 
equipment to execute its responsibilities in “ensuring the safety of the government 
and the population” (cf. Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 2002). This latter challenge deals 
with concrete deficiencies such as the lack of police infrastructures (buildings), 
transport, material, communication media, etc. A severe consequence is the 
unwillingness of the police to intervene in particular situations and the focus on 
other not-provided missions, such as well-paid private security provision. 
The Challenges of Leadership and Coordination 
Since the Congolese police reform has for long been outshined by other challenges 
for the Congolese government and the international community in the DRC, 
integrated coordination structures that bring together all the relevant actors in this 
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reform has only recently been put into place. International and European policies 
were first and foremost based on an ad hoc basis with a short-term perspective and 
with limited international coordination and a complete lack of Congolese 
ownership. The focus of these short-term ad hoc initiatives was the smooth 
organization of and security during the first democratic elections in the country in 
2005, that were postponed to 2006. The transitional GDRC, headed by President 
Joseph Kabila, was only a second order player since it was created and legitimized 
under international supervision. 
As has been elaborated, at the European level the Council deployed the civilian 
EUPOL Kinshasa mission to support the creation of the IPU’s responsible for the 
securitization of the elections. The European Commission executed a preparatory 
training of the IPU in 2005 and supported in 2005 the police mission EUPOL 
Kinshasa by providing infrastructure, logistics and equipment for the IPU. This has 
been done under the Commission’s umbrella through a budget line of the European 
Development Fund (EDF). It makes clear that for the EU institutions, the training 
of police officers is not exclusively an ESDP affair. 
In addition to the support of the EU institutions, also some of its member states 
developed initiatives for the securitisation of the elections on an individual basis. 
Especially France and the UK contributed an important amount of financial and 
operational assistance to the police in its job to guarantee secure elections. The UK 
Development Agency provided more than £8 million for the training and 
equipment of the police in the wake of the elections and “has probably gone 
furthest in developing general security sector reform policy guidelines” 
(International Crisis Group, 2006: 9; Davis, 2009a: 27-29). France took, for instance, 
part in the training of the Congolese police, in particularly the Rapid Intervention 
Police (PIR) in 2004, also in view of the securitization of the elections. 
 
The real work towards the reform of the Congolese police started in November 
2005 with the creation of the Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme et la 
Réorganisation de la Police Nationale Congolaise (GMRRR). It was composed of 23 
experts: seven Congolese members and 16 members from international donors. 
The tasks of GMRRR were to (1) formulate recommendations for the definition of 
the future police in respect of the new constitution adopted by the transitional 
assembly, and to (2) draft a proposal for organic law for the organisation and 
functioning of the future PNC. The proposed organic law adopted by the GMRRR in 
May 2006 contains provisions on new, less complex police structures, provisions on 
recruitment and promotion conditions and rights and duties for police officers, and 
provisions on the relations between the PNC, the judicial sector and the army (RDC 
- Ministère de l’Intérieur, Décentralisation et Sécurité, 2007a). The organic law 
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aims to tackle important deficiencies of the actual police, as defined above, such as 
the complexity of the current police structures and the maladministration and even 
corruption in the recruitment and promotion conditions. 
Based on the work of the GMRRR, an action plan had to be developed to implement 
the reforms incorporated in the organic law. This conceptual work is carried out in 
the mixed Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSRP) that was created in 
February 2008 (Council of the EU, 2008; RDC - Ministère de l’Intérieur, 
Décentralisation et Sécurité, 2007b). The CSRP brings together Congolese and 
international actors under Congolese leadership, executed by General Elesse from 
the Congolese Ministry of Interior. From the Congolese part, this involves 
representatives from various ministries (Interior, Justice, Defence, Finance, etc.), 
the PNC and the civil society. From the international part, the most important 
players in the CSRP are EUPOL RDC, MONUC (UNPOL), the European 
Commission (that financed the headquarter of the committee), South-Africa, the 
UK, Angola, France, etc. (RDC - Ministère de l’Intérieur, Décentralisation et 
Sécurité, 2007c). For the elaboration of the general action plan, the CSRP was 
divided into multiple working groups, each concentrating on a specific issue, for 
instance the budget, the relations with the judicial sector, the new police 
structures, etc. Depending on the issue at stake, representatives from various 
Congolese ministries participate in these working groups (RDC - Ministère de 
l’Intérieur, Décentralisation et Sécurité, 2007b). 
However, the CSRP is subject to multiple structural deficiencies and criticisms 
from important actors in the Congolese police reform. First, theoretically it unites 
all actors involved in the Congolese police reform. In practice, however, the 
committee suffers from instability and credibility. First, the CSRP is based in 
Kinshasa in which the participation of Congolese actors (authorities, police and 
civil society) from other parts of the country lack. For instance, only in September 
2009 provincial police authorities were invited in Kinshasa to get an image of the 
CSRP. Second, the representatives of the PNC do not necessarily represent the 
opinion and approach of the PNC authorities, nor of other police officers. The same 
holds true for the CSRP’s president, General Elesse, who has a troubled relationship 
with the current Minister for Interior and Inspector-General, which undermines 
the credibility of his work, and more in general the work of the CSRP6. Third, 
although all the international actors involved in the Congolese police reform are 
members of the CSRP, in practice only a few actors actually show up for the daily 
                                                             
6 An important explanation for this troubled relationship between General Elesse and Inspector-
General Numbi is their background. Both men are former militaries, however the former was part of 
the militias that lost the war and the latter was part of the winning camp. 
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proceedings of the committee, resulting in a relatively limited number of general 
coordinating meetings. 
Perhaps the most important criticism of some international actors concerns the 
domination of EUPOL RDC in the CSRP. In Kinshasa, the mandate and role of 
EUPOL RDC focussed in the first place on the support to the Congolese authorities 
in the conceptualization of the police reform in the CSRP. From the beginning, 
EUPOL RDC, together with UNPOL took the lead in this process, partly because the 
Congolese representatives lacked leadership, yet partly to take and anchor a more 
extensive role in the Congolese police reform. This role of EUPOL RDC in Kinshasa 
has almost come to an end and other European and international partners are 
ready to take over, to accompany the Congolese police with the implementation of 
the reforms. Yet, both in Brussels and Kinshasa, it seems hard to bring the civilian 
EUPOL RDC to an end. In Brussels, it is the aspiration of particular member states 
to prolong operational presence in the Congolese police reform. Yet, this did not 
lead to a significant update or extension of its mandate. In Kinshasa, EUPOL RDC is 
very keen to continue its role as main coordinator, although this is not necessarily 
shared by the other European and international actors on the field. 
However, the CSRP managed to draft a reform action plan for the coming fifteen 
years, and an immediate short-term action plan for the first three years. Its 
conceptual role has almost come to an end since, once these action plans will be 
adopted by the GDRC, the implementation phase of the Congolese police reforms 
can start. The adoption of this action plan is very important since the priorities 
defined in it will serve as the main focus for the international community, and 
bring an end to the ad hoc initiatives that dominated the international efforts in the 
Congolese police in the recent past. 
This should be understood in view of the UK’s presence and activism in the 
Congolese police reform. In the framework of its ‘Security Sector Accountability 
and Police Reform’ programme, £80 million will be devoted the DRC the coming 
five years, of which £40 million for the police reform (DFID, 2008). This amount 
has been granted to the private consultancy organisation PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) after a public tender, that has been given the responsibility to accompany 
the Congolese police in its reform. The involvement of a private company is rather 
remarkable and has a very clear impact on the effectiveness of the implementation 
of the Congolese police reform. PwC has been granted a first slice of this budget, 
and will be evaluated by DFID after two years before the second part of this budget 
will be granted. Therefore, PwC has a more business oriented approach (‘time is 
money’) than most other international actors involved in the Congolese police 
reform. 
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However, in the British (i.e. PwC) approach concrete results will be achieved in 
cooperation with the Congolese (police) authorities rather than in cooperation with 
EUPOL RDC. With the adoption of the action plan and the start of the 
implementation phase of the Congolese police reform, a new coordination 
structure needs to be created within the existing PNC structures, or, at least should 
the Congolese authorities take up its role as real leader of the CSPR. Coordination 
under the direct leadership of the PNC will definitely not be the most ‘comfortable’, 
yet necessary for the operational coordination and the ownership of the Congolese 
police of their reforms. 
 
Figure 4 Coordination Structures in the Congolese Police Reform 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the former, current and future coordination structures and steps 
in the reform of the Congolese police. The start of the implementation with a clear 
and Congolese defined focus for the international players in this reform, is, 
however, hampered by the lack of Congolese engagement in the reform of the 
police, and more in general the lack of leadership of the GDRC. The draft organic 
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law presented by the GMRRR in 2006 on the new organisation, structures and 
functioning of the PNC is up till now not adopted yet. For more than two years, an 
intra-governmental struggle, for instance between the Ministry of Interior and the 
Ministry of Justice on the status and the authority over the judicial police (OPJ) 
impeded the GDRC to adopt the organic law and paralysed the progress in the 
police reform. The reason why the struggle on the draft organic law lasted for more 
than two years is the overload of priorities for the Congolese authorities and the 
diverse interests and agendas of various Congolese governmental actors. Or, to put 
it differently, the reform of the PNC has never been a top priority for the Congolese 
government. The reform action plan drafted by the CSRP and presented to the 
GDRC in October 2009, will also have to be adopted by the Congolese authorities. A 
new or adapted structure under the framework and leadership of the PNC will have 
to be created to translate the priorities in the action plan in operational terms that 
can be implemented by the PNC. 
Conclusion: what role for the European Union? 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is at the crossroads the coming years. This will 
also have an important impact on the European and international policies towards 
the DRC. The question for these policies is not what goals the EU puts first for the 
DRC. The questions are rather what goals and priorities the DRC puts first and how 
the EU, its member states and the international community can contribute to their 
realisation. As has been argued in this paper, the formulation and adaptation of the 
Congolese priorities and action plans in the Congolese police reform is probably 
the most important challenge for both the GDRC and the international community. 
The lack of Congolese long-term perspectives and ownership of the PNC procures 
an ongoing domination of the international actors in this police reform. 
The role of EUPOL RDC seems to be contested, however, the mission is at least 
providing the leadership and coordination that is lacking from the part of the 
Congolese government. As has been argued, the alternative risks to be a complete 
lack of leadership and coordination, and consequently a complete lack of progress 
in the field of security sector reform, and more in particular the Congolese police 
sector. Politically, it seems impossible for the European Union to leave the country. 
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